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ABSTRACT
The current state of digital forensic investigation is continuously challenged by the rapid
technological changes, the increase in the use of digital devices (both the heterogeneity and
the count), and the sheer volume of data that these devices could contain. Although it is
not directly related to the performance of Digital Forensic Investigation process, preventing
data privacy violations during the process is also a big challenge. The investigator gets full
access to the forensic image, including suspect’s private data, which may be sensitive at
times, as well as entirely unrelated to the given case under investigation. With a notion that
privacy preservation and completeness of investigation are contradicting to each other, the
digital forensics researchers have provided solutions to address the above-stated challenges
that either focus on the effectiveness of the investigation process or the data privacy preser-
vation. However, a generalized approach that preserves data privacy by affecting neither the
capabilities of the investigator, nor the overall efficiency of the investigation process is still an
open problem. In the current work, the authors have proposed a digital forensic framework
that uses case information, case profile data and expert knowledge for automation of the
digital forensic analysis process; utilizes machine learning for finding most relevant pieces of
evidence; and preserves data privacy in such a way that the overall efficiency of the digital
forensic investigation process increases without affecting the integrity and admissibility of
the evidence. The framework improves validation to enhance transparency in the investiga-
tion process. The framework also uses a secure logging mechanism to capture investigation
steps to achieve a higher level of accountability. Since the proposed framework introduces
significant enhancements to the current investigative practices more like the next version of
Digital Forensics, the authors named it ‘Digital Forensics 2.0,’ or DF 2.0 in short.
Keywords: Digital Forensics Framework, Automation, Data Privacy, Machine Learning
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1. INTRODUCTION
Digital forensic science has evolved a lot
since the first Digital Forensics Research
Workshop (Palmer et al., 2001). However,
there have been some research problems that
are continuously challenging the researchers
and practitioners till date.
The first and foremost challenge is the
ever growing data storage capacity of
digital devices (Quick & Choo, 2014). The
large volume of data increases the time
requirements for the data acquisition and
the data analysis processes (Lillis, Becker,
O’Sullivan, & Scanlon, 2016). Moreover,
since the number of cases that involve digital
evidence in some form is on the rise all over
the world, the digital forensic investigators
are facing a pressing need for reducing the
investigation time per case (Al Awadhi,
Read, Marrington, & Franqueira, 2015).
The second challenge is thrown by the in-
creasing diversity of digital devices that are
becoming available in the market (Hossain,
Fotouhi, & Hasan, 2015). A digital forensic
personnel has to continuously strive for
finding new ways (through software as well
as hardware means) to acquire and analyze
such devices (Inspectorate, 2015). The soft-
ware diversity deals with a huge number of
file-types, ever evolving Operating Systems,
the newly developed innovative applica-
tions, and other software advancements
concerning contemporary digital devices.
On the hardware front, diversity of sensors,
chips, circuit modules and other hardware
units that produce unique data streams
presents a challenge for digital forensics.
Although providing a solution to both of
the above-stated diversity challenges takes
only a one-time effort for the practitioners
and researchers; however, the rate at which
these parameters change keeps them on
their toes.
Furthermore, people tend to use separate
devices for communication, entertainment
and productivity purposes. Hence the num-
ber of individuals who own and use more
than one digital devices at a time is increas-
ing (Facebook-Business, 2014). Another
study by Facebook in 2016 reveals that
94% teens in France and 98% teens in Ger-
many own multiple devices (Facebook-IQ,
2016). The Pew Research Center pub-
lished a report in 2015 stating that around
36% of US adults own all three devices,
namely a smartphone, a computer, and a
tablet (Anderson, 2015). Another survey by
Pew in January 2017 has revealed that 77%
of US adult population owns a smartphone,
78% owns a desktop or laptop, and 51%
owns a tablet computer (Pew-Research,
2017). Although the survey presents sepa-
rate figures for the three devices, one can
safely assume that individuals who own
multiple devices are a significant part of the
US population today. The people in other
regions of the world either share similar
trends or would achieve the same figures in
the near future. The rise in the number of
devices owned per person would increase
the average number of exhibits seized in
a new case, thus increasing the respective
investigation time and efforts.
Even after finding their ways to acquire
and analyze the new digital devices, the
digital forensic examiners face the third
challenge from the rapidly changing techno-
logical advancements that change the rules
of the game now and then (Garfinkel, 2010).
The technological progress that poses a
challenge to investigators is concerned with
the increasing list of devices that are going
digital every day, thanks to the novel soft-
ware and hardware innovations. The devices
in everyday use which get equipped with
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computational, communication and digital
storage capability, commonly referred to as
Internet of Things (IoT), pose new inves-
tigative challenges to the digital forensic
process (Oriwoh, Jazani, Epiphaniou, &
Sant, 2013). Any investigation involving
such devices would require knowledge about
how the data is produced, stored and
communicated to these devices.
The fourth challenge, which is not di-
rectly connected to the functioning of the
digital forensic investigation, is data pri-
vacy protection during the digital forensic
investigation (Aminnezhad, Dehghantanha,
& Abdullah, 2012). The digital forensic
investigators always get full access to the
contents of seized storage media which
according to them is necessary for achieving
completeness. Apart from containing poten-
tial evidence files, the seized storage media
also contain owner’s private data which may
be sensitive at times like private/family
pictures and videos, business related digital
documents, medical diagnostic or treatment
reports, commercial software with license
information, and much more. Investigator’s
open access to these private files is a threat
to owner’s data privacy (Verma, Govindaraj,
& Gupta, 2016).
The data privacy protection is also re-
lated to need for transparency in the digital
forensic investigation that ensures only case-
relevant data are accessed from the seized
media and remaining private files are not
affected (Dehghantanha & Franke, 2014).
There is a pressing need for finding means
to fix accountability of the investigator in
case a data privacy breach happens during
the investigation. The two sister agencies
that work in close collaboration with digital
forensic personnel, namely the police and
the regular forensic laboratories, are facing
difficulties related to transparency and
accountability. The case of Annie Dookhan
is a good example of the same (Driscoll,
2014). To the best of authors’ knowl-
edge, there are no reported instances of
professional misconduct against digital
forensic investigators to date; however, it
is high time that the community should
adopt self-regulatory ways to improve the
transparency, as well as the accountability
of the digital investigation process.
Apart from the challenges listed above,
some researchers have predicted that mov-
ing forward the field of digital forensic
would start diverging into more specialized
sub-fields (Garfinkel, 2015). The sub-fields
would require the investigators to get expert
knowledge of the same. The digital forensic
laboratories would need an investigation
mechanism that could allow different ex-
perts to work together in a given case.
To build a capability to handle increased
number of digital forensic cases in future,
the agencies would like to have prompt
training programs that could prepare new
and inexperienced investigators.
There is one more aspect to learning
that captures the psychological, cultural,
and social characteristics of the people
who commit crimes (M. K. Rogers, 2011).
Researchers have been trying to capture
such parameters that could help in digital
forensics investigation process (M. Rogers,
1999; M. K. Rogers, Seigfried, & Tidke,
2006).
Digital forensic frameworks to date have
focused on addressing the above-stated chal-
lenges either in separation or well-defined
scenarios with controlled environmental con-
ditions. In the current work, the au-
thors have proposed a new digital foren-
sic framework that incorporates forensic
image preprocessing, tool-independent au-
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tomation, machine learning based filtration
of most relevant evidence and their privacy
level evaluation to address the above-stated
challenges. The framework proposes a new
way in which the state of the art digital
forensic research and systems could be com-
bined in one place to realize the following.
• Increased investigative efficiency by sav-
ing in the investigation time and efforts
• Improved investigative accuracy by us-
ing multiple tools at the same time
• Better investigative planning via au-
tomation
• Improved validation
• Data privacy protection for forensically
non-relevant private files
• Enhanced transparency and account-
ability
• Building expert knowledge for forensic
investigation, education, training, and
multi-agency collaborations
2. PROPOSED
SOLUTION
The framework takes forensic exhibits and
images (of desktops, laptops, smartphones,
tablets, or other devices that store data),
network logs, memory dumps, and all other
sources of digital storage as input (refer to
figure 1).
As the inputs proceed to the next phase
of ‘Forensic Preprocessing’, the inves-
tigator fills in all case related facts into a
document called Current Case Information
(CCI). The document consists of forensically
relevant data that is unique to the case un-
der investigation, like individual keywords,
timelines, and other useful information.
After that, the investigator also provides
the list of digital forensic tools, with their
respective version numbers. All input
images are processed to remove forensically
irrelevant data like files listed in NSRL (Seo,
Lim, Choi, Chang, & Lee, 2009) and dupli-
cate files (Neuner, Mulazzani, Schrittwieser,
& Weippl, 2015; Scanlon, 2016). The
forensic image formatting is also changed,
without breaking the integrity of the input,
to enable fast and parallel operations in
successive investigation phases. In case
physical devices (exhibits) are available,
then the imaging for these seized devices
is started simultaneously with the data
removal and reformatting. The authors call
the above procedure ‘forensic preprocessing’
as it precedes the actual processing for
finding evidence files (the analysis phase).
The preprocessing aims to rearrange and
consolidate the data available in all of the
submitted forensic images (provided in any
of the popular formats) so that forensic
tools could read the data concurrently.
However, all preprocessing techniques and
methods should ensure that the output
produced by them is compatible with all
digital forensic software tools. The section 3
discusses preprocessing in details.
The next step runs the ‘Automated
Digital Forensic Processing’ module.
The module takes inputs from the CCI
document, a case-specific command list, and
some already known exception commands.
The ‘Case Profile Commands (CPC)’
database contains a list of commands that
a specific digital forensic tool would require
while performing a case specific job under
a particular hardware deployment. These
commands listed in CPC-database ensure
that the planning of investigative steps is
complete and consistent with respect to a
particular type of case. For example, in
the case of a financial fraud investigation,
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Figure 1. Digital Forensic 2.0 framework flowchart
the CPC-database will contain commands
for say Encase tool, version 7.0 running
on a Windows 8.1 workstation, to per-
form a keyword search job (with a list of
unique operations, called job-sections, refer
figure 2) on a Linux machine’s forensic-
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image that has an EXT4 file-system. The
CPC-database contains the comprehensive
collection of commands and scripts, to
complete distinct tasks, which are executed
by the list of forensic software tools already
provided by the investigator.
The Exception Commands (EC) database
consists of command structure similar to
that of the CPC-database, with a distinction
that these commands aim to find evidence
files that could otherwise be missed during
the initial run of forensic tools. For example,
all PDF attachments received on Gmail
while being viewed by the receiver’s browser
generates one PNG image for each page
of the attached document (Verma, Gupta,
Sarkar, & Gupta, 2012). So, when the
user logs into their account and check their
emails with PDF files as attachments, the
PNG images corresponding to each page of
the viewed PDF document gets loaded into
the browser cache. These images could be
extracted from any of these three sources;
the cache on hard-disk drive, the RAM
dump or the Hibernation file of the system.
A digital forensic investigator should fill in
command (or scripts) to parse these PNG
files, from the sources described above, in
the EC-database.
The EC-database is a collection of all
such exclusive commands which can find
targeted content. In other words, the
database contains expert knowledge which
has been acquired over time from individual
experience, careful observations, and novel
research efforts. In case two forensic labs
enjoy a considerable amount of trust and
mutual understanding, they could share
their EC-databases. The sharing will give
the examiners on both sides the opportunity
to upgrade their knowledge and enhance
their capabilities. In case all forensic labs
in a province or state agree to share their
EC-databases, it could become a good col-
lection of valuable regional (demographic)
forensic insights.
Depending on the investigation needs,
and the availability of forensic tools, the
automation module can work with both the
open source as well as commercial digital
forensic tools. The framework requires that
the forensically relevant files processed by
the tools have a uniformly high level of data
abstraction. For example, the tools should
expands all compound files (at a lower level
of data abstraction) to extract the contained
files (at a higher level of data abstraction)
before these files could be passed on to the
next level of scrutiny by the framework.
Section 4 discusses this in more details.
The results of Automated Digital Forensic
Processing are passed on to the next step
(Relevance vs. Privacy Quotient).
Here, with the help of machine learning
algorithms, a relevance score for all potential
evidence files (obtained from the automation
module) is calculated. Similarly, the privacy
quotient for these files is also calculated
simultaneously. The investigator is then
presented with a finite list of the top scoring
relevant files. The investigator can analyze
these files to decide whether these evidence
files are sufficient to prove or disprove the
case. If the investigator wants, she could
keep on requesting the next lot of most
relevant files for further examination, till
the list of potential evidence gets exhausted.
As soon as the investigator gets sufficient
evidence from the relevance list, she may
stop the investigation and generate the case
report. However, if the investigator feels
that the artifacts enlisted in relevance list
are not sufficient, she is free to override the
filters and start over the automation module.
The framework also incorporates a Se-
Page 132 c© 2018 ADFSL
DF 2.0: Designing an automated, privacy preserving ... CDFSL Proceedings 2018
cure Logging System (from start of
the investigation till it stops) where all
actions and decisions of the investigator are
chronologically logged into a secure place.
The safe storage for these logs could either
be a hardened local server or a reliable
cloud space where the investigator has no
chance of tampering with them (Barik,
Gupta, Sinha, Mishra, & Mazumdar, 2007;
Verma, Govindaraj, & Gupta, 2014). Since
the investigator may be required to explain
her actions in case any privacy breach
or some foul play is either doubted or
reported. The secure logging ensures that
the accountability of the investigator is fixed
when such a situation arises. A brief dis-
cussion on the same is presented in section 6.
Automation used in the framework sim-
plifies repeatability of the investigation
process, which proves to be very helpful
in validating the investigation outcomes.
Especially, for the Technical Validation
which aims to check whether all steps
followed by the investigator fulfill the goals
of the investigation. Automation together
with the secure-logging will help the digital
forensic community to study and optimize
the investigative techniques followed by ex-
aminers. Repeatability and easy validation
could improve the overall transparency of
the investigative process. The framework
also ensures a three-way error reduction
mechanism using automation. Firstly, the
automation reduces the chances of human
error that may happen at any time. Sec-
ondly, the automation ensures that no step
is missed from the investigative planning
which remains consistent for a particular
type of case. Thirdly, the automation
ensures that no evidence file is missed due
to limitations of a particular tool since
results from different forensic tools are
combined to present a comprehensive list
of potential pieces of evidence. The above
solution will keep the investigative powers
of the investigator intact with good chances
that her overall efficiency gets improved.
2.1 Setup
The proposed framework needs a hardware
infrastructure that could provide both
high-performance computational power as
well as high-speed data storage and access.
A robust and capable software should also
support the hardware to realize both an
efficient parallel processing and a powerful
data management mechanism. Another
requirement for the software component of
the framework is its compatibility to run
applications and programs from all publicly
available software platforms. So, all state
of the art Operating System dependent
and Operating System independent digital
forensic tools, which are capable of working
on various digital devices, irrespective of
whether they are closed source (commercial)
or open source could be deployed on the
proposed framework.
All the forensic tools and applications that
are installed on the framework should be
able to receive command-line instructions.
Since most of the open source digital foren-
sic tools take command-line inputs, they
can easily be attached to the framework.
Since all commercial tools are closed source,
it is the responsibility of their developers to
provide a command-line support for their
respective tools. Although there are some
tools like EnCase, which accept scripts to
automate some investigative tasks, there is
still a segment of commercial tools that do
not support automation. The tools that do
not provide any support for automation can
not be used with the proposed framework.
Depending on the requirement, the pro-
posed framework can be set up on any of
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the following configurations:
1. Beowulf Cluster in a laboratory- best
suited for digital forensic laboratory
environments where a suitable number
of processing nodes could be selected
based on the budget and investigative
load (Ayers, 2009). A Beowulf cluster
file system provides support for high-
performance data access and storage.
The processing speed and efficiency of a
Beowulf cluster in a laboratory setting
are better as compared to a distributed
systems deployment or a cloud deploy-
ment of the same configuration.
2. On the Cloud - a private cloud with a
strict access control could be a useful
option for an investigation agency,
which has multiple departments lo-
cated at same or different geographical
locations (Van Baar, van Beek, & van
Eijk, 2014). Alternatively, an agency
could also rent virtual machines on
a public cloud having comparatively
high processing and data storage ca-
pabilities. The catch with cloud-based
deployment is the dependency on
limited upload and download speeds.
However, if the network speeds are
favorable, the cloud-hosted framework
could enhance remote investigations
capabilities where investigators could
simultaneously work on the same case.
3. Distributed Systems - could also be
used to deploy the framework with the
processing power comparable to above-
mentioned deployment models. How-
ever, the data access speed, the par-
allelization in processing, and the file
system capabilities would be relatively
more complicated and hard to man-
age (Richard III & Roussev, 2006).
3. PREPROCESSING
The Forensic Preprocessing module is the
first component of the proposed framework
that operates on the forensic images. The
authors call the module ‘forensic pre-
processing’ as it precedes the process of
finding evidence files (the analysis phase).
The preprocessing aims to rearrange and
consolidate the data available in all of the
submitted forensic images so that forensic
tools could read the data concurrently.
Before preprocessing could begin, the
investigator is required to fill in all case
related details into the Current Case In-
formation (CCI) document. The document
consists of forensically relevant information
about the case under investigation, like the
type of case, the name of the case, suspect’s
information, keywords of interest, timelines
of interest, targeted file types, and other
valuable information(refer figure 2). After
filling the CCI document, the investigator
also provides the list of digital forensic
tools, with their respective version numbers,
which are installed on her forensic system
and best suit the analysis requirements of
the given case. The information from the
CCI document and the tools list is used by
the preprocessing module to fine-tune its
operations.
The primary aim of the preprocessing
module is to change the data formatting of
the forensic images (without breaking their
integrity) so that the digital forensic tools
attached to the framework could perform
highly efficient parallelized operations. The
secondary aim is to remove forensically
irrelevant data from the forensic images
which include files listed in NSRL (Seo et
al., 2009) and duplicate files (Neuner et al.,
2015; Scanlon, 2016).
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In case physical devices (exhibits) are
submitted instead of their forensic images,
then the imaging for these seized devices
is started simultaneously with the data
reformatting and redundancy removal.
All preprocessing techniques and methods
should ensure that the output produced
by them is compatible with the digital
forensic software tools due to be used in the
automation phase.
The data formatting operation should
keep the integrity of the forensic images in-
tact, and hence there should be no impact
on the admissibility of the forensic evidence
extracted out of the newly formatted data.
4. AUTOMATION
The Automated Digital Forensic Processing
module aims to carry out a thorough
forensic analysis of the forensic images to
collect all case related potential pieces of
evidence without any human intervention.
The module uses the Current Case Informa-
tion (CCI) document and queries both the
Case Profile Commands (CPC) database
as well as the Exception Commands (EC)
database (refer figure 3).
The CPC-database is populated by query-
ing two tables, namely the Job-Sections
table and the Tool-Selection table (posi-
tioned at top right and bottom of figure 2
respectively). The Job-Sections table
contains information about various jobs
and sub-jobs (the author calls them job-
sections) that are carried out by the digital
forensic tools. The job name specifies a
particular task of forensic importance which
is used in a digital investigation, for example
‘keyword search.’ The keyword search can
further be divided into small tasks, like
searching keywords in all text files (let us
call it job-section 1). Similarly, searching
for keywords in pdf files is another sub-task
(let us call it job-section 2). Likewise, a
comprehensive list of well-defined subtasks
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for a particular job can be populated. If
we consider the keyword search job with
reference to a particular case (say Financial
Fraud), the investigator can identify the
list of job-sections that are useful for the
investigation of that case.
The Job-Sections table contains this
mapping for all type of known case types,
respective jobs that are needed to be
performed for these case types and the
comprehensive list of job-sections for the
same.
The Tool-Selection table contains tool
version specific commands or scripts to im-
plement job-sections from the Job-Sections
table. All of the instructions are stored with
respective parameters.
The CPC-database is populated with
case-specific commands recognized by
the tools, specified by the investigator,
for completing a collection of small in-
vestigative jobs. The values obtained
from the CCI document include specific
terms including names of the suspects,
names of the companies they are associ-
ated with, names of their partners, names
of the projects they have handled, and more.
The CPC-database holds all job specific
directives that may belong to more than one
type of case profiles; for example, keyword
search is one job which has application in
a variety of cases. The keyword search
job can be performed by various digital
forensic software tools. However, the search
technique implementation along with the
keyword list(s) would differ depending on
the tool specifications and the case profile
respectively.
The collection of all jobs that are per-
formed for a particular case type is in public
knowledge. Moreover, how a particular
job could be carried out by various digital
forensic software tools could also be docu-
mented. There are tool-specific commands
for performing a particular job which could
take specific parameters and options based
on the case type and information from the
CCI document.
All of the above information is captured
in the databases, as shown in Figure 3
that makes the automation possible. For
example, if the job requirement is keyword
search for a Financial Fraud case type where
a Windows 10 machine with EnCase version
7.1 installed on it is available, and the
forensic image is a Hard Disk Drive with
Linux installation needs to be examined,
then the first database entry for keyword
search could fetch the command(s) with
corresponding parameters and options
(if applicable). For simplicity of under-
standing the authors have all columns of
the databases in Figure 3; otherwise, the
databases could be normalized further.
Even after processing the forensic image
with a variety of digital forensic software
tools, there are some crucial evidence that
might escape the examiner’s scrutiny. For
example, with the surge in mobile phone
usage people have started taking pictures
of various documents that they use in
their daily lives. Examples include tickets,
different identity cards, business cards,
bank cheques, mark-sheets and sometimes
usernames and passwords for important
on-line accounts. The forensic tools that
search for keywords only focus on files that
have textual data, and would not be able
to search for images that have some written
content until and unless they are instructed
to do so. Experienced investigators have
knowledge of such intricate details, like
running OCR on suspected images along
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with keyword search, or filtering out the
potential pictures by their metadata in case
the OCR engine fails. These approaches
could help the investigation by obtaining
crucial evidence on the first run. The
proposed framework stores these intricate
details in the EC-database. The commands
include implementation tricks and tech-
niques that come from knowledge gathered
by forensic experts over time as well as
research breakthroughs. Structurally the
database is similar to CPC-database (refer
figure 3).
The working of the automation module
(especially the structure of CPC-database)
which is presented above is inspired by the
work of (Karabiyik & Aggarwal, 2014).
However, to the best of authors’ knowledge,
the conceptualization of the Exception
Commands database is a fresh contribution.
4.1 Design
An Expert System could be used to de-
sign the automation engine. The rules
of conducting forensic analysis could be
stored in the CPC-database. Different
variables that need to be considered like
case type, job specification, device type,
respective OS and File-System versions,
forensic tool’s name/version, and respective
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commands/parameters/options could be
modeled into the system.
4.2 Relevant vs.
Non-Relevant Files: First
level of data privacy
preservation
The outcome of the automated digital
forensic processing would give a list of
files from the forensic image(s) which are
potential pieces of evidence for the case
under investigation.
The automation module operations segre-
gate all files present in the forensic image(s)
into two classes, namely Forensically
Relevant Files (FRF) and Forensically
Irrelevant Files (FIF). The FRF ad-
vance to the next stages of the investigation,
whereas the FIF is made inaccessible to the
investigator.
The denial of access to all files (includ-
ing the private files) which are present in
FIF group, is the first level of data pri-
vacy preservation ensured by the pro-
posed framework.
5. FORENSIC
RELEVANCE VS. DATA
PRIVACY
The data privacy aims to protect owner’s
personal information from falling into hands
of unauthorized people (Fischer-Hu¨bner,
2001) (OECD, 2002). Whereas, a digital
forensic investigation seeks to find all
potential pieces of evidence that indicate
a malicious activity carried out in digital
space (Pollitt, 2004).
All files that are se-
lected/highlighted/exported at the comple-
tion of the automation module fall into the
Forensically Relevant Files (FRF) group.
The number of files in the FRF is still large
enough for the investigators to examine
individually. Moreover, a considerable
number of owner’s private files that do
not qualify as concrete evidence are also
included in the FRF collection. Hence,
finding actual evidence files from the FRF
group is undoubtedly a massive manual
effort, which further involves a significant
risk of data privacy violations for the private
files that do not have much of evidential
value.
The proposed framework uses machine
learning to determine the degree of relevance
(details in subsection 5.1) as well as the
level of privacy (details in subsection 5.2)
for all files present in the FRF group. The
investigator is presented with the top most
relevant files (say, a bunch of top 20 or top
50) for examination, with their respective
level of privacy also marked on them.
The next set of most relevant files is
not presented to the investigator until she
examines the first bunch and feels that
further investigation is needed. Only after
the investigator raises an explicit request to
the system, the next bunch (succeeding 20
or 50) of files is presented for her scrutiny.
The process of request and grant continues
until the investigator finds all actual evi-
dence needed to resolve the case or the list
of FRF gets exhausted. In a rather unusual
situation when the examiner feels that the
automation module should be rerun, the
framework provides a provision of doing so
too.
The above-stated mechanism, for present-
ing most relevant files in a bunch until the
investigator finds concrete evidence to prove
or disprove the case, also prevents privacy
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breach to an extent. The process could also
be understood as the second level of data
privacy preservation which is ensured
by the proposed framework. Although the
data privacy protection in this filtration
process is not absolute, the data privacy of
a large number of files belonging to FRF is
significantly preserved.
5.1 Degree of Relevance
The proposed framework classifies files based
on their degree of relevance to the current
case under investigation. The classification
process needs to process data available in
the Evidence Features (EF) database (Fig-
ure 4). The EF-database takes information
about each file that is selected into FRF, and
some case specific information from the Cur-
rent Case Information (CCI) document.
5.1.1 Feature selection
The aim is to classify each file in the FRF
into a potentially-conclusive or a potentially-
indecisive piece of evidence. The informa-
tion stored in the EF-database correspond-
ing to each file, belonging to the FRF for a
particular case under investigation, acts as a
feature-set for a machine learning implemen-
tation. The features can come from:
1. The file’s metadata: includes informa-
tion like - File-Type; Time-Stamps;
File-Size; File-Address; File Containing
Folder Name; File Containing Folder
Depth; Access Control Permissions;
and Owner(s) of the File1.
2. Source image and the automation
module: includes information like -
Forensic Tool that selected the file;
More than one Tool selected the file
1 The list is not exhaustive and may contain more
features.
(Y/N); Job-Type; Job-Section; Level
of Data Abstraction; Did the file
got extracted from a compound file
(Y/N); Source Image Format; Source
Image File-System; Source Image
Operating-System; Source Image Stor-
age Technology1.
3. Use of the Exception Commands:
includes information like - Is a result of
Exception Command (Y/N); Number
of Exception Commands used; Excep-
tion Command IDs1.
4. The associated Current Case Infor-
mation: includes information like -
Case-ID; Case-type; Has Keywords
of Interest (Y/N); Has Name from
Suspect List (Y/N); Is File Type of
Interest (Y/N); Does Fall into Timeline
of Interest (Y/N)1.
The order of features in above-listed
sources do not reflect their respective signif-
icance.
5.1.2 Data collection
The data collection happens when a case is
investigated using the framework. Two op-
tions that may be used by the investigating
agencies while doing the data collection are
discussed below:
1. Data collection for a particular type
of case: It includes collecting data
while investigating cases of the same
kind. For example, If an investigative
agency analyzes only Financial Frauds
cases, then all features collected in the
Evidence Features database will help in
forming a machine learning prediction
model most suited for financial fraud
cases. Creating a model for a particular
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kind of case is considerably easy because
each case shares a high degree of com-
monality in their respective feature sets.
2. Data collection for all type of cases: It
includes collecting data while investi-
gating cases of all kinds. The features
collected in the Evidence Features
database will form a machine learn-
ing prediction model that could find
potentially-conclusive evidence for any
given case. Creating a generic model
that can make predictions for any case
at hand is a difficult task as compared
to the previous option because the
feature sets will have many variations.
5.1.3 Machine learning approach for
relevance
As already stated before, the machine learn-
ing solution aims to classify each file in the
FRF into either a Potentially Conclusive
(PC) or a Potentially Indecisive (PI)
evidence. Hence, to put it formally -
1. The machine learning approach ad-
dresses a two-class classification
problem (a supervised learning tech-
nique). The reason for choosing a
supervised learning approach is to learn
from the experience of the investigators
who have already solved similar cases.
The framework needs access to the case
related artifacts like the case infor-
mation document, the forensic image
associated with that case, information
about the tools that were used to solve
the case, and the list of actual evidence
files that concluded the investigation.
The first three artifacts (mentioned in
the previous paragraph) could be used
by the framework to collect feature
information about all the FRF files,
whereas the last object would act as
the ground truth for training. All
actual evidence that the investigator
marks at the completion of each case
investigation helps populating the
last feature column that is helpful in
training.
After training on some examples of
solved cases of the same type, the
machine learning solution could start
predicting for a new case. However, for
a generalized solution, the training set
should contain a considerable number
of examples of each type of cases that
have been solved by the investigative
agency before the solution could start
predicting.
Evidence 
Features 
Evidence 
No. 
Relevance 
Score 
Evidence-33 98
Evidence-52 96
Evidence-40 90
Evidence-16 90
… … 
Features Sourced 
from: 
1. File’s metadata
2. From automation 
module
3. Exception Commands
4. Current Case 
Information (CCI)
Figure 4. Degree of relevance for forensically
relevant files.
2. The supervised learning approach could
be implemented using an ensemble
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learning method like Decision tree or
Random Forest that give considerably
good results when the training data set
is less, and the feature set is relatively
strong.
The authors think the above-stated
learning methods are suitable for the
classification task (PC vs. PI) when
developing a prediction model for the
same type of cases with a relatively
small training dataset. However, if
an investigation agency that has a
collection of a substantial number of
cases of the same type say hundred or
more cases of financial fraud, then they
could try other algorithms like Support
Vector Machine (SVM) and k-Nearest
Neighbors (kNN).
When a generic solution needs to be
created, an ample number of cases
of each type that the investigation
agency works on is required. However,
if multiple agencies agree to share their
EF-databases and list of conclusive
evidence for respective cases, the aim
of making a generic prediction solution
could be achieved.
The machine learning approach finds PC
files and calculates a relevance score for
each of them. The files are then arranged
from highest relevance score to the lowest.
The framework ensures that only a bunch
of most relevant files are presented to the
investigator and rest of the files are masked
from her. The investigator asks for the
next bunch of files if required. The process
continues till the investigator finds all
conclusive pieces of evidence or the list of
FRF gets exhausted. The machine learning
solution’s efficiency increases with the
number of solved cases getting incorporated
into the training set.
5.1.4 Mathematical Formulation of
Relevance Score
Let the number of input cases be n and the
number of features corresponding to an in-
dividual file be x (from the EF-database).
C = {C1, C2, C3, ..., Cn}
Where, C represent the case vector. The
case instance Ci can be represented as a col-
lection of its respective FRFs.
Ci = {F1, F5, F7, . . . , Fj, . . .}
Where, Fj is the j
th file in Ci’s FRF. Every
file in the above set can have a maximum of
x features, and the feature vector for Fj can
be represented as:
fFj = {f 1j , f 2j , f 3j , ..., fxj }
∀ Fj ∈ Ci; ∃ r ∈ (1 to x), where f rj = 0
So, the case Ci together with its FRF and
respective feature vectors can be represented
in matrix form as:
Ci =

F1
F2
F3
.
.
Fj
.

=

f 11 f
2
1 f
3
1 f
4
1 f
5
1 . f
x
1
f 12 f
2
2 f
3
2 f
4
2 f
5
2 . f
x
2
f 13 f
2
3 f
3
3 f
4
3 f
5
3 . f
x
3
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
f 1j f
2
j f
3
j f
4
j f
5
j . f
x
j
. . . . . . .

The input cases ground truth evidence can
be represented as
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E =

E1
E2
E3
.
Ei
.
En

and Ei accounts for the evidence vector cor-
responding to the ith case which was declared
solved after finding files having conclusive
evidence. For example, the evidence vector
will have a collection of files like
Ei = {F1, F3, F5, . . .}
where, F iles in Ei ⊂ Files in Ci
Here, the feature vector corresponding to the
evidence Ei would consist of the union of all
prominent features of files mentioned above.
fEi = fF1 ∪ fF3 ∪ fF5 ∪ . . .
Let us assume that the features which get
selected are following:
fEi = {f 1i , f 5i , f 9i , f 15i , f 19i , f 21i , . . . , fxi }
Since we have x input features, the weight
vector W can be represented as
W =

W1
W2
W3
.
.
.
Wx

and,
W = funtion1(FeaturesMatrix, EvidenceV ector)
The Relevance Score (RS ) for each file
present in FRF can be computed as
RS = function2(WeightV ector, FeaturesMatrix)
The computation of RS is followed by sort-
ing of the Potentially Conclusive(PC) files
from the highest relevance score to lower.
The files get clustered into various sets say p
number of sets and each set has m number
of files which can be represented as
S = {S1, S2, S3, . . . , Sk, . . . , Sp}, and
Sk = {F1, F2, F3, . . . , Fl, . . . Fm}
As explained in the sub-subsection 5.1.3 the
potentially conclusive evidence are can be
presented for the investigator’s scrutiny us-
ing the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 Evidence examination
for k = 1 to p do
Pick Sk
for l = 1 to m do
if Fl is PC-Evidence then
Bookmark Fl
break
else
continue
end if
end for
end for
5.2 Privacy Quotient
The framework also identifies whether a
file is private or it contains any Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) about the
suspect. The aim is to correlate the data
privacy information for each file with their
respective evidence rating (from the previ-
ous subsection). The privacy information of
each file will not restrict the investigative
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capabilities of the forensic examiner in
any way. However, the privacy quotient of
the individual file would enable both the
suspect and the legal authorities to assess
the scale of data privacy violation, if it
happens during the investigation process.
A specific module named Private and
PII Identification (p2i3) runs on all files
belonging to FRF (refer figure 1). The
authors have marked the p2i3-module as
a separate entity in the flow diagram;
however, the module could be a part of the
automation engine if some of the forensic
tools support the required functionality.
For example, the tool EnCase (version 7
and up) has the provision of finding files
that contain personal information as well as
artifacts containing Personally Identifiable
Information.
All files in the FRF group are examined
to determine whether they are private to the
suspect or contain any of her PII.
5.2.1 Feature selection
The information stored in the Privacy Fea-
tures (PF) database acts a feature-set for
machine learning implementation to find
each file’s privacy quotient. The features are
described below:
1. Features from file’s metadata (same as
in the EF-database): It captures infor-
mation like - File-Type; Time-Stamps;
File-Size; File-Address; File containing
folder name; File containing folder
depth; Access-Control permissions;
Owner(s) of the file2.
2. Features from the source image and
the p2i3 module: It captures infor-
mation like - Source image format;
2 The list is not exhaustive and may contain more
features.
Privacy 
Features  
Evidence 
No. 
Privacy 
Category 
Evidence-33 PF
Evidence-52 PF
Evidence-40 NPF
Evidence-16 PCF
… … 
Features Sourced 
from: 
1. File’s metadata
2. From p2i3 module
3. Current Case 
Information
Figure 5. Privacy quotient for forensically
relevant files.
Source image File-System; Source
image Operating-System; Source im-
age storage technology; Is the file
a private file (Y/N); Type of the
private information identified; More
than one type of private information
present (Y/N); Does the file contain
any PII (Y/N); Type of PII identi-
fied; More than one PII present (Y/N)2.
3. Features from the CCI document: it
captures information like - Case-ID;
Case-type; Has keywords of interest
(Y/N); Has name(s) from the suspects
list (Y/N); Is the File-Type of interest
(Y/N); Does the file fall into Timeline
of Interest (Y/N)2.
The data collection part of the privacy
rating solution is same as that of the evi-
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dence rating solution (refer sub-subsection
5.1.2).
5.2.2 Machine learning approach for
privacy quotient
The aim of the machine learning implemen-
tation in the privacy solution is to categorize
files from the FRF group into three groups;
namely, the Private Files (PF), PII Con-
taining Files (PCF), and Non-Private Files
(NPF). Hence, to put it formally -
1. The machine learning approach ad-
dresses a clustering problem. An
unsupervised machine learning ap-
proach is used to categorize the files
into one of three clusters (PF, PCF,
and NPF ) as described above.
2. The unsupervised learning approach
can use a k-means algorithm to segre-
gate the files into these three clusters.
However, there are good chances that
the third cluster NPF could get more
than 35% of sample population (files
from FRF), making the k-means cluster
analysis unfruitful. In such a situation
the solution needs one extra level of
processing.
The k-means algorithm should be
started with a higher value, preferably
3 to 4 times the value of the number
of required clusters “n” (which is cur-
rently 3 ). An inflated value of n would
produce 9 to 12 clusters, each of which
would comply with the condition of
having the sample population between
5 - 35%.
A secondary level of clustering on top
of these results (using the Hierarchical
Clustering) will club them into the fi-
nal three clusters namely, PF, PCF, and
NPF.
6. SECURE LOGGING
SYSTEM
The logging process ensures that all opera-
tions from the starting state in the proposed
framework (refer the flowchart in figure 1)
till the state when the investigation stops
are recorded. The logging also ensures that
all actions of the examiner starting from the
time when she begins the analysis process
till all conclusive evidence get identified
are listed. All system operations and
investigator actions need logging because
of two reasons; firstly, to resolve conflicting
situations like allegations of data privacy
violations; secondly, for studying investi-
gation styles of examiners for learning and
training purposes.
The logging system could fulfill both
of the above-stated requirements only
when the logs are complete as well as
tamper-proof. The first requirement of
completeness, which is relatively easy to
achieve, refers to logging all activities of the
system and the investigator.
However, the second requirement of
ensuring that the logs become tamper-proof
is a difficult problem. The first possible
solution could capture the activity logs with
the help of a dedicated application running
on the forensic system. This solution
assumes that the examiner is cooperative
and honest enough not to interfere with
the logging application. After the inves-
tigation process is complete, the logging
application should transfer the logs to an
external storage place which is safe from
tampering. Any tampering attempt during
its operation would cause the application to
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stop prematurely, invalidating the captured
logs.
The second possible solution should try
to capture examiner’s activities at the
operating system level (with a system level
application or module) and save the logs
in a safe location. The safe storage for
these logs could either be a hardened local
server or a reliable cloud space where the
investigator has no chance of tampering
with them (Barik et al., 2007).
Since the investigator may be required
to explain her actions in case any privacy
breach or some foul play is either doubted
or reported. The secure logging fixes the
accountability of the investigator for her
actions, in case such a situation arises.
7. RELATED WORK
Ayers (2009) enlist the limitation of the
first generation of digital forensic tools that
are struggling with the huge volumes of
data involved in modern day investigations.
The author proposes several parameters to
measure efficiency together with the require-
ments that need to be incorporated into the
second generation of digital forensic tools.
The author also proposed processing archi-
tecture of second generation tools which
utilizes Beowulf clusters, supercomputers,
distributed systems, and grid computing.
The evidence storage, workflow manage-
ment and software reliability of the second
generation tools are also discussed. The
paper provides requirements and high-level
characteristics of the system that was under
development.
Garfinkel (2010) also talks about the
requirement for data standardization
and modular mechanisms in the field for
digital forensics and digital forensic research.
Van Baar et al. (2014) have brilliantly
moved the digital forensic processing on a
cloud where high-end machines could speed
up processing and help different actors
involved in a digital forensic investigation
to collaborate on a particular case.
Carrier, Spafford, et al. (2005) proposed
a way to automate searches in digital
forensic investigations. Richard III and
Roussev (2006) suggested a way to handle
large-scale digital investigations with the
use of distributed computing. They pro-
posed the use of a cluster of distributed
computers to facilitate processing and store
the images and results at a central data
store. The authors suggested the use of
automation by all forensic tools so that
they may handle the challenges of tomorrow.
Abbott, Bell, Clark, De Vel, and Mohay
(2006) proposed an automated way to
correlate events for digital forensic inves-
tigation. The authors also demonstrate
implementation using publically available
digital forensic scenarios and data.
Dehghantanha and Franke (2014) have
defined the same as a cross-disciplinary
field of research and named it as ‘privacy-
respecting digital investigation’. They
also talk about the present challenges and
opportunities that the field has to offer.
Aminnezhad et al. (2012) state that
digital forensic investigators face a dilemma
whether they should protect suspects’
data privacy or achieve completeness in
their investigation. The paper also states
that there is a lack of awareness among
professional digital forensic investigators
regarding suspects’ data privacy, which
could result in an unintentional abuse.
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There have been attempts to protect data
privacy during digital forensic investigation
using cryptographic mechanisms. Law et
al. (2011) have proposed a way to protect
the data privacy using encryption. The
authors talk of encrypting data set on an
email server and indexing the case related
keywords, both at the same time. The
investigator gives keyword input to the
server owner, who has the encryption keys,
to get back the emails that contain the
keyword.
Hou, Uehara, Yiu, Hui, and Chow
(2011b) propose a mechanism to protect
the privacy of data on third party service
providers storage center form the investiga-
tor using homomorphic and commutative
encryption. At the same time, the mecha-
nism also ensures that the service provider
does not get to know the queries that were
fired by the investigator. Hou, Uehara, Yiu,
Hui, and Chow (2011a) talk of a similar
solution on a remote server.
Shebaro and Crandall (2011) use Identity
Based Encryption to carry out a network
traffic data investigation in privacy preserv-
ing setting. Guo, Jin, and Huang (2011)
put forward generic privacy policies for
network forensic investigations.
Croft and Olivier (2010) have proposed a
mechanism where data is compartmentalized
into layers of sensitivity, less private data
on lower layers and highly private data on
higher layers. Investigators access to private
information is controlled by initially restrict-
ing his access to the lower layers first. The
investigator is required to prove his knowl-
edge of the low-level layers, to get access
higher level information.
8. CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK
The authors have proposed a new digital
forensic framework that brings efficiency in
digital forensic processing with the help of
automation while preserving data privacy
for the suspect. The framework ensures
that the automation supports a range of
digital forensic software tools and produces
effective outcomes by incorporating the
current case information, case profile data,
the knowledge of experienced digital forensic
investigators. The investigator is presented
with the most relevant evidence that are
sorted with the help of machine learning
algorithms. The framework balances the
investigative requirements of the case with
the data privacy protection of suspect’s
forensically irrelevant private files.
The framework ensures that the effi-
ciency of investigation is enhanced, without
compromising on the outcomes of the
investigation or affecting the investigative
powers of the examiner. However, since the
system is securely logging all actions of the
investigator, she experiences a greater sense
of accountability for avoiding unwanted
data privacy violations. The automation
and secure logging encourage a better
validation check, hence bringing a higher
level of transparency into the investigation
process.
The authors are in the course of imple-
menting a critical framework section partic-
ularly the machine learning solution for de-
termining the relevance of the potential evi-
dence as well as finding the privacy quotient
of forensically relevant files for a particular
type of cases. The authors also plan to ex-
tend the solution that covers all type of cases
handled by a typical digital forensic labora-
tory.
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